My article has recently been published in the great American Journal of International Law (AJIL) (see on this). The peer review process is impressive and probably quite unique in the legal academic (see here for a brief insight): Six anonymized members of the distinguished Board of Editors and the two Editors-in-Chief analyzed my article in-depth look and enriched it with exceptionally insightful comments. In „Alternatives to Adjudication in International Law: A Case Study of the Ombudsperson to the ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions Regime of the UN Security Council“, which is available open access, I use the case study about the Ombudsperson to examine the phenomenon of international complaints mechanisms.
Here is the abstract:
The “temporary golden age” of international courts is likely over. States seeking to provide oversight mechanisms and individual remedies at the international level are likely to opt for less intrusive and more flexible alternatives to adjudication. This Article analyzes the phenomenon of international complaint mechanisms through a detailed case study of the Ombudsperson to the ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions regime. The analysis reveals an in-built tension between principle and pragmatism: While the severe effects of the regime on listed persons normatively call for an independent adjudicator, the Ombudsperson’s institutional design falls short of requirements deemed essential for adjudication in troubling ways, yet it proves to be a surprisingly effective remedy. Drawing on this case study to demonstrate how politically skillful and incremental institution-building can compensate for many institutional shortcomings of international complaint mechanisms, the Article makes the case for the establishment of such bodies, even when they are formally weak.